Four experiments familiarized 6-, 9-, 12-, and 16-month-old infants to a solid block that was repeatedly lowered into a semitransparent container. In test trials the end state, containment, was either compatible or incompatible with the objects' size and position. In Experiment 1, infants saw the block and box successively before they observed the end state. This forced infants to attend to each object individually and memorize its size and position while observing the end state. In Experiments 2 and 3, the block and container were shown simultaneously, the block suspended above the container at a distance of either 25 cm (Experiment 2) or 2 cm (Experiment 3). The shorter distance made direct comparison easier to perform. In Experiment 4, the full event was shown in which the block was lowered inside the container from a distance of 25 cm. Infants' perception of containment was related to the visual information that was available. When the event made it easier to grasp the relevant information, infants could perceive whether the block could pass in the container at a progressively younger age.
Developmentalists now widely agree that infants are able to perceive objects and functional relations between objects as outcomes of events they observe, such as support, collision, occlusion, causality, and containment (Aguiar & Baillargeon, 1998 , 1999 , 2003 Baillargeon, 1991; Baillargeon & Wang, 2002; Belanger & Desrochers, 2001; Cohen & Amsel, 1998; Casasola, Cohen, & Chiarello, 2003; Cohen, Rundell, Spellman, & Cashon, 1999; Dejonckheere, Smitsman, & Verhofstadt-Denève, 2005 Hespos & Baillargeon, 2001a , 2001b Kotovsky & Baillargeon, 1998; Oakes, 1994; Sitskoorn & Smitsman, 1995 , 1997 Spelke, Breinlinger, Macomber, & Jacobson, 1992; Wang, Kaufman, & Baillargeon, 2003) . However, researchers do not have a clear understanding of mechanisms that enable infants to discriminate different end states, extract properties to anticipate end states for objects, and perceive the information to which these mechanisms get attuned. When infants get older, and their exploratory and cognitive skills increase, the mechanisms and the information used may change. The present research addressed these issues by showing 6-to 16-month-old infants containment events that varied the presence of object motion and the relative distance when an object was lowered into a container.
Containment events form an important category of daily occurring events that provide abundant experiences for infants to exercise their skills of information gathering and to build their experiences, knowledge, and understanding of the physical and social world. According to Thompson (2007) : "Cognition is the exercise of skillful know-how in situated embodied action. Cognitive structures and processes emerge from recurrent sensorimotor patterns of perception and action" (p. 13). In particular, observing object events, such as containment and the objects involved enables infants to attune their sensorimotor systems to emerging spatiotemporal relationships between those objects and the objects' end states. Furthermore, it supports them to discover the properties on which these relationships and end states depend. These properties concern characteristics of the objects themselves and, more importantly, of their changing geometric and dynamic relationships during the course of an event. Systematic investigation of infants' attunement to object events may shed light on the situated and embodied nature of cognitive development, an important theme in current debates about cognition (Clark, 1997; Wilson, 2002) .
In four experiments, the present study addressed the issue above by thorough investigation of infants' perception of containment and the information they attended. By varying task constraints (i.e., object motion and relative distance), we wanted to gain insight into infants' developing skill of gathering information about objects and events that the objects are involved with. Insight in this skill with respect to containment under varying task constraints may provide understanding about embodied cognition, how it arises and changes during children's first years of life, and constraints on which this development depends.
Gathering information from events plays an important role in current views on infants' developing insight about objects and object functions (Baillargeon, 2004; Dejonckheere et al., 2006) . The functions objects may have are as much properties of physical events as they are of the objects that make those events happen (Smitsman & Bongers, 2003; Smitsman, Cox, & Bongers 2005) . For instance, Baillargeon and her colleagues provided a detailed account of how infants' physical knowledge develops (see Baillargeon, 2004 , for an overview). At the basis of this development, they supposed an early capability for categorizing different events, such as containment, occlusion, and support (Baillargeon & Wang, 2002) . Later on, the knowledge gets more differentiated, in the sense that infants will discover object variables, such as width and height, which are of relevance to the outcome of those events.
Categorization of events requires the ability to pick up information that specifies events and sets them apart them from other events. Nonetheless, systematic investigation of information that infants attend to while distinguishing different events and extracting properties for anticipating end states is scarce. Such information is available in the way an event evolves and attains its outcome. There is a lawfulness in the way an event evolves, the outcome that is attained, and the objects that are involved in the process. However, we know very little about infants' perception of the threefold relation between objects, event, and outcome.
Let us take two different events from Baillargeon and her colleagues' (Baillargeon, 2004; Baillargeon & Wang, 2002; Hespos & Baillargeon, 2001a , 2001b research to highlight what information might be necessary for categorizing events: an event in which an object is lowered and disappears behind another nontransparent object, and an event in which the same object disappears inside this nontransparent object after being lowered. Let us call the first event an occlusion event and the second a containment event. What makes those events distinct to the perceiver? This is due to neither the objects nor their original position in space. On the basis of the objects themselves and their spatial position at the start, one cannot anticipate the end state. The objects are the same, and their position is similar at the start of both events. The events become maximally dissimilar when the object that is lowered gets closer to the other object and begins to disappear. Disappearing behind an object's outer contour or inside its inner contour are topologically different phenomena. In the first case, the descending object becomes occluded by the outer contour of the other object; in the second case, it also gets occluded by the outer contour but is now fully surrounded by that contour, while at the same time it occludes part of the inner contour.
One might argue that infants have to attend to these topological differences to distinguish the events. Later on, directing attention to those differences might also enable them to discover the object and event variables that determine the end state of the event. The topology that unfolds over time provides information about the relative size and position of the objects, which are both important variables to predict the end state. Although Baillargeon and colleagues acknowledge the relevance of relative information for infants' judgments about object functions such as containment, their theorizing mainly focuses on quantitative judgments and reasoning about abstract object representations. According to Aguiar and Baillargeon (2003) , at 6 months of age, infants already predict containment outcomes quantitatively, on the basis of variables such as width. Before that age, at 4 months, infants would make qualitative judgments with respect to containment and width. They contrast quantitative judgments with qualitative judgments. The first one would be based on the infants' memory of an object with respect to some abstract size dimension, such as width or height. The second one would be based on a direct visual comparison between objects. Qualitative judgments would develop before quantitative judgments in a task-specific way. The distinction memory versus direct visual comparison does not, however, enable us to clarify what information infants extract to scale or remember the object in both cases. For instance, in violation of expectancy tasks, Aguiar and Baillargeon (2003) showed that 6-month-old infants' looking times were longer for containment events in which outcomes were incompatible with the relative widths of an object and a container, compared with outcomes that agreed with the relative widths of both objects. Longer looking even occurred when the infants could not see the objects close together in space and had to remember the separate sizes of the object and container while observing the outcome later on. Notwithstanding these findings, remarks are in place. Although infants could not see the object at the same time together in space, they might still have scaled the objects earlier when these were shown with respect to the larger spatial layout of the experimental setup, which was similar for both objects, and have thus used relative information.
A major question concerns the metric infants use to scale objects with respect to their fit for containment. The topology that unfolds when an event such as containment proceeds provides a relative metric to visually scale the size and position of one object to the other object. When describing the learning situation needed to identify variables that are of relevance to an outcome, Baillargeon (2004) used terms that actually refer to the topology of the event. For instance, to discover that height is a significant variable to infer whether an object can fully cover another object, 12-monthold infants need to learn to attend to the spatial relation of cover and object and to contrastive outcomes that occur for covers that are large enough or covers that are not large enough. Moreover, studies that more directly bear on this question provide little support for the claim that absolute quantitative comparisons are made. Children's perception of quantities such as the height of a dowel showed that neither 6-month-old infants Huttenlocher, Duffy, & Levine, 2002) nor 4-year-old children used an absolute metric. They scaled the height of the dowel to the height of a glass container in which the dowel was positioned, thus using a relative metric. In addition, findings of Hespos and Baillargeon (2001a , 2001b ) raise questions about the use of an absolute metric. Their results showed that infants' judgment of height of objects depended on the context within which the objects were shown. They revealed that 6-month-old infants could assess whether an occluder was tall enough to hide an object but not whether a container was sufficiently high to conceal the object. Finally, most conclusions are based on the violation-of-expectancy paradigm. This paradigm puts a heavy burden on interpretation (Haith, 1998; Hood, 2004) , especially when one infers the presence of higher level concepts and processes, such as reasoning about width, are inferred on the basis of infants' looking. The paradigm creates a high risk of faulty conclusions about longer looking times on test trials. These longer times may result from other factors than those considered by the experimenter. One way to solve the problem, beyond the scope of this study, is to study the dynamics of the habituation process itself (Schöner & Thelen, 2006) . Another way to deal with such critics, as the present study does, is detailed investigation of the task to gain insight in properties that do and do not affect infants' looking. Thus, by systematically varying the information displayed by an event and the objects involved, we may unravel the kind of information that infants are and are not sensitive to.
The present study addressed 6-to 16-month-old infants' developing perception of the threefold relationship between objects, process, and outcome in containment events. The study extends the setup that was originally developed by Sitskoorn and Smitsman (1995) . They showed that 6-month-old infants attend to and can discriminate between the topologies that unfold when an object descends toward a container and passes into this container or becomes supported by the container's rim. In case of containment, they familiarized infants with an object that was repeatedly lowered into a container and lifted up from that container again. In some of the test trials, the opening of the container was made too small for the object to pass through. However, the rim of the container consisted of hidden flaps with springs underneath that were of the same size as the overlap. When the descending object touched the rim, it pushed these flaps down, and to the eye of the perceiver, it could pass through the rim unobstructedly. The researchers found longer looking times for this magically seeming passing-through event compared with trials that showed the passing-through of the habituation phase in which the object's width fitted the diameter of the opening. Dejonckheere et al. (2005) replicated these results for 6-, 9-, and 12-month-old infants in a study that varied the number of places through which the object could magically pass. When the object magically passed through the rim at only one place, it was more difficult for infants to discern this odd way of passing through. In that case, only infants 12 months old and older showed longer looking times, as Sitskoorn and Smitsman (1997) had shown. A further study showed that the longer looking times of infants were not due to a simple perceptual saliency effect of passing through. When 9-and 12-month-old infants observed passing-through for an object that was too wide for a container with a rim made of foam, they did not show longer looking times, compared with those for a fitting container. When the object passed through that rim, the rim deformed. This made the event even more dissimilar from the habituation event than in test trials when the object magically passed through a rim. Thus, it was not the perceptual discrepancy between test and habituation phase per se that determined infants' looking times but the topologically incompatible way the object passed through.
The above studies clearly show that at the age of 6 months, infants pay attention to the topology that specifies containment and can discern whether the way the event unfolds is consistent with containment. To further test the significance of the topological information for infants' perception of containment, Dejonckheere et al. (2006) covered the passing-through episode of the event with a 9-cm-high screen in front of the container starting at the level of the rim. When the experimenters showed the descent of the object into a too narrow container and occluded the passing-through episode from sight, only 16-month-old infants, and not younger infants, showed longer looking times. In a final study (Dejonckheere et al., 2007) , a screen hid part of the trajectory but left the last 2, 5, or 16 cm above the container rim free for visual inspection. Longer looking times were found for end states that were inconsistent with the relative width of the objects, compared with states that were consistent with the relative width in tests with younger infants. However, the age at which infants noticed the incompatible end state depended on the distance to the container top that was visible. At 16 months, infants looked longer when the distance was 2 cm. For infants at 12 months and 9 months, the distance needed to be 5 and 16 cm, respectively. All together, the above results show that infants attend to the topology that is specific to containment. With age, they become more skillful in attuning their visual system to the changing spatial layout of the event, enabling them to pick up this information.
In all of the above studies, motion information was present that may have drawn infants' attention to the objects and the topology that leads to the end state. To investigate infants' perception of the relation between objects, process, and outcome in more detail, the present study varied the presence of motion information and object distance in more detail in subsequent experiments. In fact, the setup combined the procedure of Aguiar and Baillargeon (2003) and that of Dejonckheere et al. (2005) . However, the setup of the present study differed in two important respects from that of Aguiar and Baillargeon (2003) . First, it varied the information that is available from complete visibility of the event as one extreme, to the other extreme, where the display shows only the interacting objects successively at the start of the event. In the latter case, a screen hid the lowering of the block into the container box. Second, we used the considerably less oversized block of Dejonckheere et al. (2005) with an overlap between container and block of 20%, compared with 50% in Aguiar and Baillargeon's (2003) study. The smaller amount of overlap made the task harder. But as we needed a task that challenged infants to pay attention to the relations that unfolded when the event proceeded, we had to push their system more to the limit. We already know that infants can discriminate end states under these more demanding conditions. However, will they still be able to do so when less information is available and task constraints change? During incompatible test trials, the block collided against the rim in three places: the sides and the front. In making the block collide against the rim at the front, we manipulated object orientation. The manipulation of orientation does not, however, necessarily make the task harder for infants. Dejonckheere et al. (2005) found that the number of places the block collided against the rim is an important factor that facilitated infants' discovery of whether an event agreed with containment. In addition, when infants extract width, as Aguiar and Baillargeon's (2003) results and those of Wang, Baillargeon, & Brueckner (2004) suggest, they should be able to see whether an outcome agrees with containment, even without noticing the inadequate orientation at the front.
To investigate the significance of different sources of event information in 6-, 9-, 12-, and 16-month-old infants, the study varied the information that was available in different experiments. In the most extreme situation (Experiment 4), the display showed the complete event in habituation as well as in test trials. As in Dejonckheere et al.'s (2005) study, we familiarized infants with a solid block that was repeatedly lowered into a semitransparent box and was lifted up again to its original position until the infant reached the habituation criterion. In the test phase, the same event was displayed in two test trials, one in which the block was lowered and fitted into the container before being lifted again. In the other condition, the block did not fit the container, thereby colliding against the container rim in three places. As a result of flexible flaps in the rim, the block "magically" passed through the rim, entering the container, before being lifted up again. When the event was shown completely, the display furnished information about each of the objects, about the objects' topology at the larger distance of 25 cm at the start of the trial, about changes in this topology when the block approached the container opening and passed through, and finally about the way of passing through the opening. Subsequent experiments systematically showed less of the above information. The experiments that displayed less of the event were most similar to the setup used by Aguiar and Baillargeon (2003) in terms of procedure yet not in terms of configural setup.
To systematically hide event information, an opaque screen was placed in front of the container before the block was lowered, as in Aguiar and Baillargeon's (2003) setup. The screen occluded any motion of the block when it was lowered. In Experiment 1, the screen also occluded the container when the block was shown. Each trial started with displaying the container and the block successively to force infants to attend to each object separately and to keep each object in memory. Thus, in this experiment, infants could only infer whether the block would fit into the opening of the container. During habituation as well as during the test phase, each trial started with showing the container in front of the infant. Subsequently, an opaque screen occurred in front of the container, hiding it from view. Then the block appeared suspended above the hidden container and screen at a distance of 25 cm from the container top. This was the same distance used at the start of each trial in Experiment 4. The block was mechanically lowered behind the screen. After it had entered the container, invisible to the infant, the screen was taken away, showing the block inside the container. Before the block returned to its original position, the screen was again placed in front of the container. Two subsequent experiments used the same procedure as Experiment 1, with the exception that container and block were not shown successively but at the same time. In Experiment 2, the block was suspended above the container at a distance of 25 cm, the same as used in Experiments 1 and 4. In Experiment 3, the distance was considerably shorter: 2 cm as measured from the bottom of the block to the container top.
If event information plays a significant role in infants' discovery of containment, and if looking and attending form an integral part in extracting this information, we expected the following. Seeing the event in full supported extraction of the causal structure that underlies containment. Seeing the block being lowered toward the box opening off-loads the cognitive work to keep the object properties in memory (cf. Wilson, 2002) and keeps attention directed toward the goal of the event: entering the box. It aids the infant to continuously scale and rescale the space occupied by the block with regard to the space left open by the container opening for the block to enter without collision. When both objects did not fit, it would make observation possible of whether entering agreed with the causal structure of the event.
Scaling would become more difficult when the event was displayed without motion and when the distance between the objects became larger. We assumed that the scaling operation is an embodied process that requires intermittent gazing at both objects, which is available to infants by the age of 5-6 months (see von Hofsten, 2003, for an overview). In the case of motion, the constant information about where the block was heading signaled the box as the goal of the event. Although we did not measure eye movements, we assumed that motion aided intermittent gazing at both objects (Johnson, Slemmer, & Amso, 2004) . Without motion, scaling would be more difficult, and would even be more so for larger distances than shorter distances. If the objects are shown successively, cognitive load of keeping the object in memory would add to the just stated difficulties.
In sum, the task would be most difficult when the objects were shown successively. Thus, in taking the infants' age as an indication of the difficulty of the task for Experiments 1-4, we expected that with age, infants would show progressively longer looking times for test trials that are incompatible with the causal structure of the event for more tasks. That is, from Experiment 4 through Experiment 1, the task would become progressively more difficult, with only the oldest age group in Experiment 1 being able to solve the problem but groups of all ages being able to do so in Experiment 4.
Experiment 1

Method Subjects
Sixty infants (31 boys, 29 girls) participated in the experiment. Fifteen infants (8 boys, 7 girls) were 6 months old (M ϭ 184.1 days, SD ϭ 8.5), 15 infants (6 boys, 9 girls) were 9 months old (M ϭ 264.2 days, SD ϭ 4.6), 15 infants (9 boys, 6 girls) were 12 months old (M ϭ 360.7 days, SD ϭ 6.8), and 15 infants (8 boys, 7 girls) were 16 months old (M ϭ 485.1 days, SD ϭ 7.9). An additional 4 infants were tested, but data were removed from the analysis because of fussiness. Names and addresses of the participants were obtained from the municipal government in Ghent, Belgium. After the experiment the infants were offered a toy; parents were not compensated for participation. Information on parents' education, occupation, income and race or ethnicity was not collected.
Apparatus and Objects
Display box. A picture of the overall setup is presented in Figure 1 . The display box was positioned 50 cm above the ground and was 142 cm high, 51 cm wide, and 50 cm deep. The box was painted white and had an opening in its front section (38 cm high, 20 cm wide) enabling the infant to see the block and the container. With the aid of a cord, a white opaque screen could be lowered to cover the opening. The back wall of the display box was coated with a grid structure of white and black squares to strengthen the movements of the block relative to the background. A bell (noise level approximately 70 dB) and a lamp (40 W) were mounted on the ceiling of the display box. Each time a trial started, the bell was rung, the lamp was switched on, and the screen was lifted up. Two wooden panels (180 cm high, 100 cm wide) were positioned on each side of the display box to make the computers, their emitted light, and the movements of the experimenters invisible to the child.
Block and containers.
The block was made of red-coated plastic and was 16 cm high, 15 cm wide, and 10 cm deep. This block was attached to a metal arm in the display box, which in turn was connected to a software-driven motor system (noise level Ͻ 50 dB). Two semitransparent containers were used (15 cm high, 25 cm wide, and 20 cm deep). One container had a small rim (1 cm wide), whereas the other had a wide rim (4 cm). The rim of the wide-rim container contained three flexible parts. The flexible parts could be invisibly pushed down by the block, thereby allowing the block to enter the container without making any noise. Collision against the flexible parts of the rim occurred when the container was rotated at a 90°angle. The flexible parts were at the left, right, and front of the container rim in the rotated orientation and precisely matched the depth of the block and the width at the front. When the block was lifted out again, springs underneath the flexible parts pushed the parts back in their initial position, thereby strengthening the illusion that the block magically passed through the rim of the container. Containers were randomly dappled with white spots.
Computers. Two Pentium III computers were used. A first computer was attached to the motor system of the display box. With this computer, start and end positions of the block and time intervals between two block actions could be determined. In addition, it indicated which block-container pair had to be prepared. A second computer was used to measure each infant's looking time.
Camcorders, video, and monitor. Two digital camcorders (Panasonic AW-E300E and Sony DSR-PD150P) were used. One camcorder, registering the block movements, was mounted against the ceiling of the experimenters' room behind the infant. The other camcorder, registering the infant's gaze, was placed behind a small gap inside the right panel. Both video signals were transmitted to a mixing console and combined and recorded on video. This new video signal was in turn transmitted to a monitor near the experimenters. On the left side of the monitor screen, the block movements were presented; on the right side, the infant could be seen. A cardboard was positioned in the middle of the monitor screen in such a way that the experimenter who measured the infant's looking could not see what was happening in the display box and did not know the order in which the events were presented.
Design and Procedure
The infant's head was about 70 cm from the display cabin, and the angle between eye level and the position of the blockcontainer was about 45°, which gave the infant the opportunity to see the container slightly from above. Parents were told not to interact with their infant. Two experimenters were involved. Experimenter 1 operated the first computer, which was hooked up to the display cabin. He rang the bell and pulled up the curtain each time a trial started. With the aid of a button, the block could be started and stopped. This descent and withdrawal rate was dependent on the motor capacity and averaged 20 cm/s. Experimenter 2 monitored the infant's looking by means of the monitor behind the panels and pressed a button on a keyboard that started a timer each time the infant looked at the block or the container and stopped the timer when the infant looked away.
A variant of an infant-controlled familiarization of visual looking time was used (Horowitz, Paden, Bhana, Aitchison, & Self, 1972) . After Experimenter 1 rang the bell, the curtain was lifted for 1 s just below the bottom side of the block (see Figure 2) . Only the container could be seen. As soon as the infant had accumulated 3 s of looking at the container, Experimenter 1 manually placed a yellow cardboard screen in front of the container in 1 s. Next, the curtain was lifted in 1 s, until the block was fully visible. The block was suspended at a distance of 25 cm above the container rim. The experimenter waited 2 s, then lowered the block (2 s), where it remained for another 1-s pause. Then, the yellow cardboard was removed (2 s), and the infant could see the block in the container (2 s). Next, the yellow cardboard was put into position again (1 s), and after 1 s of waiting, the block was lifted out, until it reached its starting position (2.5 s). The second cycle was identical to the first one with the exception that once the curtain was lifted, the container was shown for a fixed period of 2 s instead of waiting until the infant accumulated 3 s of looking time. This second cycle was repeated until the computer signaled that the infant had looked at the event for at least 2 s and then continuously looked away for another 2 s. Next, the trial was ended, the window of the display box was lowered, and a new trial was prepared. Trials in turn continued until the infant had been presented a total of eight trials, or when a 50% or greater decrease in looking times occurred on two consecutive trials, compared with looking times on the first two trials. In the habituation phase, two conditions occurred (see Figure 2) . In one condition, the block was lowered into a frontally positioned, narrow-rim container without collision. In a second condition, the container was laterally positioned by rotating it at a 90°angle, and this also did not result in a collision. The two habituation conditions were presented on alternate trials, counterbalanced across subjects.
Once the habituation criterion had been met, the test phase was started without further delay. The test phase was similar to the habituation phase with the exception that the rim of the container was now widened (see Figure 2) . Accordingly, no collision occurred when the block was lowered into the frontally positioned container. However, when the container was laterally positioned and the container was placed slightly backward relative to the block, collision did occur against the rim in three places: on the front, on the left, and on the right. In the test phase, three test trials per condition (incompatible-opening vs. compatible-opening trials) were presented, resulting in a total of six test trials. Test trials were presented on alternate trials, counterbalanced across subjects.
After the experiment, looking times were rated from the videotape in seconds. For each infant this was done by two independent observers. Interobserver reliability per trial per infant averaged 89% in the habituation phase and 91% in the test phase. A mean score for each block-container combination and for each infant served as data in the analysis.
Results and Discussion
Habituation Phase
The mean number of habituation trials necessary to reach the habituation criterion was 6.1 for the 6-month-olds, 5.5 for the 9-month-olds, 5.9 for the 12-month-olds, and 5.2 for the 16-month-olds. Infants' looking times are presented in Table 1 . A 4 ϫ 1 A number of studies opted for a fixed number of trials (e.g., Aguiar & Baillargeon, 1998 , 2003 Hespos & Baillargeon, 2001a , 2001b . Other studies varied the number of trials a familiarization phase consisted of (e.g., Aguiar & Baillargeon, 2002; Bremner et al., 2005; Cashon & Cohen, 2000; Dejonckheere et al., 2005; Johnson et al., 2004; Sitskoorn & Smitsman, 1995 , 1997 . We preferred a variable familiarization criterion to a fixed criterion to reduce the number of infants who might become fussy during habituation. 2 ϫ 2 mixed-model analysis of variance was performed with age (6, 9, 12, and 16 months old) and order (frontally positioned container vs. rotated container first) as between-subjects variables and container orientation (frontally positioned container vs. rotated container) as within-subjects variable. Looking time was the dependent variable. No significant effects of container orientation, order, and age were found (all Fs Ͻ 1).
Test Phase
Infants' looking times during test trials were analyzed by means of a 4 ϫ 2 ϫ 2 mixed-model analysis of variance with age (6, 9, 12, and 16 months old) and order (incompatible-opening trial vs. compatible-opening trial first) as between-subjects variables and test event (incompatible-opening trials vs. compatible-opening trials) as within-subjects variable. Again, looking time was the dependent variable. Looking times are presented in Figure 3 .
A significant effect was found for test event: infants looked longer at incompatible-opening trials than at compatible-opening trials, F(1, 52) ϭ 16.2, p Ͻ .0002 (compatible-opening trials: M ϭ 17.3, SD ϭ 4.4; incompatible-opening trials: M ϭ 18.9, SD ϭ 4.7).
In addition, we found an effect of age, F(3, 52) ϭ 4.8, p Ͻ .006 (6-month-olds: M ϭ 15.4, SD ϭ 2.9; 9-month-olds: M ϭ 18.6, SD ϭ 4.6; 12-month-olds: M ϭ 17.5, SD ϭ 3.5; 16-month-olds: M ϭ 20.7, SD ϭ 5.0). Finally, the interaction of Age ϫ Test event for looking times was significant, F(3, 52) ϭ 11.0, p Ͻ .0001. A post hoc analysis with Tukey's honestly significant difference (HSD) showed significant differences between incompatibleopening trials and compatible-opening trials for 16-month-olds ( p Ͻ .0002). Fourteen of the 16-month-old infants looked longer at the incompatible-opening trials than at the compatible-opening trials (Wilcoxon's T ϭ 5, p ϭ .002). In the other age groups (6, 9, and 12 months old), no significant differences between incompatible-opening trials and compatible-opening trials were found.
In Experiment 1, at the beginning of the event, infants could observe only one object at a time. Seeing the second object (i.e., the block), infants had to remember the size and position of the first object (i.e., the container). When the outcome of the event was displayed, infants had to infer whether this end state could have occurred on the basis of the information they gathered and remembered about the objects at the start of the event.
Results revealed that only 16-month-olds were able to differentiate outcomes of test trials that agreed with containment from outcomes that fell short of the causal structure of containment. These results form a sharp contrast to those of Aguiar and Baillargeon (2003) . They showed that in similar circumstances, yet for objects of a much larger overlap in size of about 50%, 6.5-monthold infants could differentiate between both outcomes. Wang et al. (2004) showed the same results even in 4-month-old infants. Results indicate that a reduction in overlap from 50% to about 20% makes the task considerably more difficult for infants. The results are also in contrast to those of Dejonckheere et al. (2005) and Smitsman (1995, 1997) , who showed a full display of the event. In these studies, 6-to 8-month-old infants did perceive whether an outcome agreed with containment for objects of a comparable overlap (about 20%) as used in the present study. Apart from the reduction in overlap and the absence of motion, there are two more alternative explanations for the discrepancy in results between different studies. The first one could be the longer procedure time of the present experiment compared with that of Aguiar and Baillargeon's (2003) study. In the present experiment, one cycle lasted about 18.5 s, whereas in the study of Aguiar and Baillargeon, this period averaged 11 s. One could argue then that the longer procedure time might have led to distress in infants. This might be the case for 6-month-old infants. However, the finding that even at 12 months of age infants did not look shorter at trials that agreed with containment, compared with trials that did not agree with containment, makes this hypothesis unlikely. The second alternative explanation concerns the incongruent position of the block with respect to the container in test trials. The position might have made the task more difficult compared with those used by Aguiar and Baillargeon (2003) and Wang et al. (2004) , in which infants had to attend solely to width. This second alternative, however, is also problematic: If infants would have solely attended to width, they should still have noticed that the outcome could not have occurred in case of overlap between the block and the container. Moreover, position was added to width, to increase the number of places the block and rim would overlap and the block would collide against the rim in incompatible test trials. Dejonckheere et al. (2005) showed that increasing this number made it easier for young children to differentiate between different end states.
The results are in line with those of Dejonckheere et al. (2006) . The researchers showed infants a block that was lowered into a container but occluded the area where the block entered the container opening. Hiding that area prevented infants from seeing the block pass through the opening. Infants 9 and 12 months old were no longer able to perceive whether the outcome agreed with containment, but 16-month-old infants could still differentiate between the different end states. Altogether, a conclusion seems to be that infants, for the first time, at 16 months are able to differentiate between containment-compatible and -incompatible outcomes when they can see the objects successively. An alternative interpretation might be that the longer looking times for 16-monthold infants in the present study were not the result of seeing an outcome that did not agree with containment but the result of their surprise at seeing an uncommon display: a block in a container with a caved-in opening. This explanation is highly unlikely. First, the display used is not as unusual as it may appear at first sight. For instance, toy boxes with differently shaped openings to push through differently shaped objects show a similar display (e.g., cross-shaped objects that fit in cross-shaped openings). Second, and more importantly, this conclusion does not agree with the results of Dejonckheere et al. (2006) when a screen obstructed infants' vision of the block inside the rim in the container as in this study. Then, 16-month-old infants could still differentiate the different outcomes. Thus, irrespective of whether 16-month-old infants can see this display of the end result, or even the moment of passing through, they look longer when an object enters a container in which it does not fit.
A final comment on Experiment 1 might be that the criteria for habituation were loose, which makes it questionable whether the infants were truly habituated. When we consider the low number of infants who needed the full 8 trials (1 infant at 6 months, 2 infants at 9 months, 2 infants at 12 months, and 0 infants at 16 months), the comment seems not in place. Moreover, the mean number of habituation trials infants needed in Experiment 1 (5.7 trials on average) is not surprisingly different from those of other studies. For instance, Sitskoorn and Smitsman (1995) registered 5.3 trials for 6-to 9-month-olds on average. In another study of the same authors (Sitskoorn & Smitsman, 1997) , 6-to 12-month-olds needed 5 habituation trials. Aguiar and Baillargeon (2002) reported that the greater part of 3-to 3.5-month-olds needed 7 trials to habituate in an occlusion experiment. Finally, Aguiar and Baillargeon (2003) and Baillargeon (2001a, 2001b ) used 4 -6 trials in a fixed habituation phase. In contrast, some studies that used dynamic displays reported 9 -15 trials to habituate (e.g., Clearfield, 2004; Feigenson, Carey, & Spelke, 2002) . A difference between the later studies and the studies mentioned before might be that the first group of studies used a display that was controlled mechanically, whereas in the later group of studies the display was set manually. It is not inconceivable that young infants are more easily habituated in a stronger controlled environment (speed, trajectory, etc.) than when a human hand is used to move the objects in the display.
All in all, the present results suggest that the higher the difficulty in judging containment, the more infants need other pieces of information regarding those events. To further investigate this hypothesis, a first step is to reduce the load on memory to make this judgment. Thus, in Experiment 2, infants were presented with the two objects at the same time, so that they did not have to keep one object in memory while observing the other object. They could now compare both objects directly by intermittently gazing at both objects.
Experiment 2
Method Subjects
Sixty infants (30 boys, 30 girls) participated in the experiment. Fifteen infants (6 boys, 9 girls) were 6 months old (M ϭ 183.5 days, SD ϭ 9.1), 15 infants (8 boys, 7 girls) were 9 months old (M ϭ 259.4 days, SD ϭ 7.8), 15 infants (9 boys, 6 girls) were 12 months old (M ϭ 362.8 days, SD ϭ 11.1), and 15 infants (7 boys, 8 girls) were 16 months old (M ϭ 482.7 days, SD ϭ 7.7). Data from 7 infants were removed from the primary data set because of inattentiveness (1 infant), anger (2 infants), and fussiness (4 infants). Names and addresses of the participants were obtained from the municipal government in Ghent, Belgium. After the experiment, the infants were offered a toy; parents were not compensated for their participation. Information on parents' education, occupation, income, and race or ethnicity was not collected.
Apparatus, Objects, Design, and Procedure
The apparatus and objects were identical to those used in Experiment 1 with the exception that before a trial started, infants were shown the block and the container at the same time for a limited period. Infants were familiarized with a downward motion of the block as in Experiment 1 (see Figure 4) . After Experimenter 1 rang the bell and lifted the curtain completely, the block was kept stationary and visible above the container at a distance of 25 cm, as measured from its bottom to the top of the container, until the infant had a total of 3 s of looking at the block and the container. Then, the experimenter put the cardboard into position (1 s), waited 2 s, lowered the block (2 s), and held the block stationary (1 s). After this, the cardboard screen was removed (2 s), the block in the container was shown (2 s), and the cardboard screen was put into position again (1 s). Finally, after 1 s of waiting, the block was lifted out until it reached its starting position (2.5 s). The second cycle was identical to the first one. However, instead of waiting 3 s of accumulation time, the block and the container were shown for a fixed period of 2 s.
As in Experiment 1, the test events were identical to habituation events with the exception that the rim of the container was widened. Collision against the rim could occur in three places (on the front, on the left, and on the right) when the container was rotated at a 90°angle and pushed backward (see Figure 4) .
Interobserver reliability per trial per infant averaged 93% in the habituation phase and 90% in the test phase.
Results and Discussion
Habituation Phase
The mean number of habituation trials to reach criterion was 5.3 for the 6-month-olds, 6.7 for the 9-month-olds, 4.9 for the 12-month-olds, and 5.7 for the 16-month-olds. Infants' looking times are presented in Table 2 . A 4 ϫ 2 ϫ 2 mixed-model analysis of variance was performed with age (6, 9, 12, and 16 months old), and order (frontally positioned container vs. rotated container first) as between-subjects variables and container orientation (frontally positioned container vs. rotated container) as within-subjects variable. Looking time was the dependent variable. No significant effects of container orientation, order, and age were found (all Fs Ͻ 1).
Test Phase
Infants' looking times during test trials were analyzed by means of a 4 ϫ 2 ϫ 2 mixed-model analysis of variance with age (6, 9, In the other age groups (6, 9, and 12 months old), no significant differences between incompatible-opening trials and compatible-opening trials were found. Although infants could compare the block and the container directly, a pattern of looking times turned up similar to the one found in Experiment 1: infants 16 months old, but not 6, 9, and 12 months old, looked longer when the block was lying in a container opening that was too narrow, compared with when the block was lying in a container with a wide opening. The results of Experiment 2 indicate that the simultaneous presence of both objects did not aid young infants in gathering information about the possibility of containment. Infants 16 months old did not need the simultaneous presence of both objects as Experiment 1 showed, and younger infants did not profit from the simultaneous presence of the objects. This result, together with that of Experiment 1, indicates that the ability to keep properties in memory is not a crucial factor for determining whether containment is feasible for objects that were seen successively. The next study investigates whether infants can gather information about the relative size and position of both objects when both objects are simultaneously present and the distance between them is much shorter.
Experiment 3
Method Subjects
The final set consisted of 60 infants (31 boys, 29 girls). Fifteen infants (7 boys, 8 girls) were 6 months old (M ϭ 186.2 days, SD ϭ 7.3), 15 infants (9 boys, 6 girls) were 9 months old (M ϭ 265.3 days, SD ϭ 6.1), 15 infants (9 boys, 6 girls) were 12 months old (M ϭ 361.5 days, SD ϭ 7.5), and 15 infants (6 boys, 9 girls) were 16 months old (M ϭ 486.2 days, SD ϭ 8.7). The data of 7 infants were removed from the analyses because of fussiness (4 infants) and inattentiveness (1 infant). The data of another 2 infants were removed because they could not be habituated. Infants were offered a toy after the experiment; parents were not compensated for participation. Names and addresses of participants were obtained from the municipal government in Ghent, Belgium. Information on parents' education, occupation, income, and race or ethnicity was not collected.
Apparatus, Objects, Design, and Procedure
Apparatus and objects were identical to those of the previous experiments. Design and procedure of habituation and test events were similar to those of Experiment 2 with the exception that the starting position of the block was now 2 cm above the container rim, as measured from the bottom of the block to the top of the container (see Figure 6 ). Thus, infants could more easily compare the size of the block with that of the container opening and their relative position. As in the previous experiments, a first cycle started when the infant had a total of 3 s of looking time at the block and the container. Experimenter 1 would then put the cardboard into position in 1 s. After 2 s, the block was lowered into the container in 0.5 s, where it remained stationary for 1 s. Experimenter 1 subsequently removed the cardboard in 2 s, showed the block in the container in 2 s, put the cardboard back into position in 1 s, waited for 1 s, and pulled up the block in 1 s. Interobserver reliability per trial per infant averaged 93% in the habituation phase and 87% in the test phase.
Results and Discussion
Habituation Phase
The mean number of habituation trials to reach criterion was 6.7 for the 6-month-olds, 6.8 for the 9-month-olds, 6.0 for the 12-month-olds, and 5.7 for the 16-month-olds. Mean looking times are presented in Table 3 . By means of a 4 ϫ 2 ϫ 2 mixed-model analysis of variance with age (6, 9, 12, and 16 months old) and order (frontally positioned container vs. rotated container first) as between-subjects variables and container orientation (frontally positioned container vs. rotated container) as within-subject variable. Looking time was the dependent variable. No significant effects of container orientation, order, and age were found (all Fs Ͻ 2).
Test Phase
By means of a 4 ϫ 2 ϫ 2 mixed-model analysis of variance with age (6, 9, 12, and 16 months old) and order (small-opening trial vs. large-opening trial first) as between-subjects variables and test event (incompatible-opening trials vs. compatible-opening trials) as within-subjects variable, looking time was analyzed. Age did not prove to be significant (F Ͻ 1). However, there was a significant main effect of test event, F(1, 52) ϭ 22.98, p Ͻ .0001 (compatible-opening trials: M ϭ 20.7, SD ϭ 7.0; incompatibleopening trials: M ϭ 26.1, SD ϭ 9.2). In addition, the interaction of Age ϫ Test event was significant, F(3, 52) ϭ 2.82, p Ͻ .05. By means of Tukey's multiple-range test (HSD), it was further revealed that looking times for incompatible-opening trials differed from compatible-opening trials for 12-and 16-month-olds but not for 6-and 9-month-olds (12-month-olds: p Ͻ .05; 16-month-olds: p Ͻ .002). At the age of 16 months, 13 of the 16 infants looked longer at incompatible-opening trials than at the compatibleopening trials, (Wilcoxon's T ϭ 4.5, p ϭ .002). At the age of 12 months, 12 of the 16 infants looked longer at incompatibleopening trials than at compatible-opening trials (Wilcoxon's T ϭ 13.5, p ϭ .01). In the other age groups (6 and 9 months old), no significant differences between incompatible-opening trials and compatible-opening trials were found. Looking times are presented in Figure 7 . All in all, in Experiment 3, infants 12 and 16 months old looked longer at the incompatible-opening trials than at the compatibleopening trials. In contrast, 6-month-olds and 9-month-olds did not significantly look longer when they saw the block lying within a too narrow container opening at the end of a test trial. This shows that when the block and container are positioned closer to each other, 12-month-olds are also able to extract object information for perceiving containment. The results also indicate that 6-and 9-month-olds can still not discover whether containment can take place for the objects they observe close to each other. Because solely seeing the objects close to each other is insufficient at the age of 6 and 9 months, we test in Experiment 4 whether a display of the event that shows motion as well as proximity of the objects will be sufficient for perceiving containment.
Experiment 4
Method Subjects
Sixty infants (25 boys, 35 girls) participated in the experiment. Fifteen infants (7 boys, 8 girls) were 6 months old (M ϭ 182.4 days, SD ϭ 10.3), 15 infants (5 boys, 10 girls) were 9 months old (M ϭ 269.1 days, SD ϭ 8.2), 15 infants (8 boys, 7 girls) were 12 months old (M ϭ 360.9 days, SD ϭ 10.4), and 15 infants (5 boys, 10 girls) were 16 months old (M ϭ 485.3 days, SD ϭ 8.2). Data from 5 infants were removed from the primary data set: 3 infants because of fussiness and 2 infants because of inattentiveness. Names and addresses of the participants were obtained from the municipal government in Ghent, Belgium. After the experiment, the infants were offered a toy; parents were not compensated for participation. Information on parents' education, occupation, income, and race or ethnicity was not collected.
Apparatus, Objects, Design, and Procedure
The apparatus, objects, design, and procedure in Experiment 4 were similar to those used in Experiments 1, 2, and 3 with the exception that no cardboard was used to hide the lowering of the block (see Figure 8 ). In the habituation phase, a cycle now consisted of lowering the block in 2 s, remaining stationary for 1 s, lifting out in 2.5 s, and remaining suspended for 1 s. Test events were identical to habituation events with the exception that the rim of the container was widened. Therefore collision and noncollision trials occurred. Interobserver reliability per trial per infant averaged 93% in the habituation phase and 87% in the test phase.
Results and Discussion
Habituation Phase
The mean number of habituation trials to reach the habituation criterion was 5.7 for the 6-month-olds, 6.2 for the 9-month-olds, 5.8 for the 12-month-olds, and 5.5 for the 16-month-olds. Infants' looking times are presented in Table 4 . Looking time was analyzed by means of a 4 ϫ 2 ϫ 2 mixed-model analysis of variance with age (6, 9, 12, and 16 months old) and order (frontally positioned container vs. rotated container first) as between-subjects variables and container position (frontally positioned container vs. rotated container) as within-subjects variable. No significant effects of container position, order, and age were found (all Fs Ͻ 1).
Test Phase
Infants' looking times during test trials were compared by means of a 4 ϫ 2 ϫ 2 mixed-model analysis of variance with age (6, 9, 12, and 16 months old) and order (incompatible-opening trial vs. compatible-opening trial first) as between-subjects variables and test event (incompatible-opening trials vs. compatible-opening trials) as within-subjects variable. Looking time was the dependent variable. Figure 9 represents the mean looking times at the test events of the infants. Results revealed significant longer looking times for infants 6, 9, 12, and 16 months old for incompatible-opening trials compared with compatible-opening trials, F(1, 52) ϭ 56.23, p Ͻ .001 (compatible-opening trials: M ϭ 22.9, SD ϭ 5.7; incompatible-opening trials: M ϭ 29.3, SD ϭ 6.0). No effects of age, order, and Age ϫ Test event for looking times were significant (all Fs Ͻ 1). A post hoc analysis with Tukey's HSD showed significant differences between incompatible-opening trials and compatible-opening trials for infants 6 ( p Ͻ .02), 9 ( p Ͻ .002), 12 ( p Ͻ .03), and 16 months old ( p Ͻ .02). Fourteen of the 15 infants at the age of 16 months looked longer at the incompatible-opening trials than at the compatible-opening trials (Wilcoxon's T ϭ 7, p ϭ .003), as did 12 of the 15 infants at the age of 12 months (Wilcoxon's T ϭ 12, p ϭ .006), 15 of the 15 infants at the age of 9 months (Wilcoxon's T ϭ 0, p ϭ .0006), and 13 of the 15 infants at the age of 6 months (Wilcoxon's T ϭ 6, p ϭ .002).
In Experiment 4, infants could freely observe how the block approached the rim of the container and passed through this rim. We hypothesized that seeing an event aids infants to discover properties of objects on which interactions between them depend. Indeed, Experiment 4 showed longer looking times for incompatible-opening trials with infants 6, 9, 12, and 16 months old. The difference in results between Experiments 3 and 4 rules out the possibility that the closer distance of block to the container rim is the determining factor in enabling 6-and 9-month-old infants to gather the relevant information about the objects. Results indicate that the motion of the block formed a crucial source of information for these age groups. The question remains which aspect of the motion affords young children's discovery of the relevant information. We elaborate on this issue in the General Discussion.
General Discussion
The present study was set up to investigate the significance of different sources of event information used by 6-to 16-month-old infants in their discovery of containment. We hypothesized that systematic investigation of infants' attention and the information that draws infants' attention would provide insight about the situatedness of infants' growing experience of objects and object relations in events and the embodiment of this experience. In four experiments, infants observed an event in which a block was repeatedly lowered into and lifted out of a container. In test trials, the same event was displayed, but in some of the trials, the opening at the top of the box was too narrow for the block to pass through. Despite the opening being too narrow for the block to fit in, the block did pass through, which was due to the masked flexible flaps in the rim of the container that had the same size as the block's dimensions in the horizontal plane. The four experiments varied the available event information from a full event display to a partial event display. In the full event display, infants could observe all stages: from lowering of the block, starting at 25 cm above the container, until the block arrived inside the container, and finally to when the block returned to its original position (Experiment 4). In the partial event displays, all motion was hidden by a screen, but at the start of a trial, infants could observe either both objects together at a distance of 2 cm (Experiment 3) or both objects together at a distance of 25 cm (Experiment 2) or each object successively (Experiment 1). In all event displays, infants could observe the end state: the block inside the container.
We hypothesized that hiding event information would make it progressively more difficult for infants to discriminate end states that either agreed with the causal structure of containment or did not agree. Moreover, seeing the objects successively (Experiment 1) would add to the difficulty of the task because it increased the cognitive load of keeping one object in memory when seeing the other object. Going from Experiment 4 to Experiment 1, we expected the age at which infants could perceive the compatibility of an end state to increase. Thus, age differences were used as indication of the difficulty of the task.
Results essentially underscored our predictions. We found a clear difference in results between the conditions in which infants observed containment events where the interaction itself was hidden from view (Experiments 1-3) and conditions in which the interaction was completely visible (Experiment 4). In the latter case, infants of all ages looked longer when the object passed through a container opening that was too narrow, compared with when the object fitted into the container opening. However, in the first three experiments, when motion was absent, only infants 12 months old and older looked longer when the block passed through a nonfitting opening compared with a fitting opening.
At 12 months, infants needed to see the objects simultaneously at a short distance but could not differentiate between compatible and incompatible outcomes of the event at a longer distance of 25 cm. However, at 16 months, infants could differentiate between these states when they observed the objects simultaneously at the longer distance. They could do so even when they observed each of the objects successively. Thus, keeping an object in memory did not add noticeable difficulty for 16-month-olds. The present results highlight the significance of motion information and distance for perceiving containment, especially for younger infants. With age, motion information and distance become subsequently less important. The late presence of the capability to anticipate a containment outcome without the support of event information agrees with findings of a recent study of Ö rnkloo and von Hofsten (2007) . They showed that at 22 months, infants first anticipated how to maneuver an object into a hole when they needed to insert objects of different cross sections into fitting holes. There was no event that supported their anticipation, but by their action they had to generate the event themselves.
What is the implication of these results for the processes that underlie infants' developing insight about object relations, in particular containment? The findings highlight the significance of exploratory activities such as looking and event information to support infants' perception of containment. They also add to results from our earlier studies (Dejonckheere et al., 2005 (Dejonckheere et al., , 2006 (Dejonckheere et al., , 2007 , which together suggest two interrelated processes that develop with age. The first concerns the process of discriminating different outcomes on the basis of the topology that arises for the objects when they interact and that distinguishes different outcomes. The second concerns the process of extracting the relevant object and motion properties from the topology that arises. Extraction of these properties enables infants to anticipate the end state when they see the objects and their motion at the start of the event and onward. Naturally, both processes are interrelated. Extraction requires the infant to attune the visual system to the relevant information and to keep track of the event and geometric relations that unfold over time. Thus, in both processes, gazing at the objects plays a central role, supported by information the event furnishes. We discuss our findings and their implications for the development of these processes in more detail below.
The topology that arises for objects when one object descends toward another object is captured by relations such as "overlap" and "outside" or "no overlap" and "inside." Occurrence of these relations varies with the shape, size, and position of the objects. By attending to these relations, infants begin to discover that these properties are related to the end state of the event and are thus of relevance to the outcome. When infants begin to extract such properties by attending to the topology, they actually begin to visually scale the objects to each other with respect to these properties. The present results indicate that such a process underlies infants' perception of containment and that infants become more skillful with age to perform the process. As a consequence, infants need less and less information to support the process. Thus, the finding that infants attend to the topology that arises for the objects essentially means that they (a) start to use one object as a frame to scale the other object, anticipating the outcome; (b) begin to discover which properties are of relevance to scale the objects; (c) scale the objects by gazing at both objects; and (d) need motion information at younger ages to keep the gaze directed at both objects and a short distance at older ages when motion information is absent.
Why are motion and distance between objects important to scale the objects, and what do our results suggest about the development of this skill? The most plausible answer seems to be that to scale the objects with respect to each other, infants need to direct their gaze at both objects. They can do this in one glance when the distance is very short or by intermittently gazing at each object successively when the distance increases. Both require the control of eye movements, and the coordination of eye movements with head movements, which is available at the age of 5-6 months (von Hofsten, 2003; von Hofsten & Rosander, 1997) .
To focus attention to different targets for comparison and prospecting an end state, infants also need information about what and where these targets are. Motion provides a powerful source of information for specifying these targets. First, an object that is moving will draw an infant's attention. Second, the moving object provides a continuous flow of directional information about where the object is heading, in this case toward the container. Although more remotely related, studies on infants' goal attributions of actions suggest that they are sensitive to this information at this age (Hauf, Elsner, & Aschersleben, 2004; Kiraly, Jovanovic, Prinz, Aschersleben, & Gergely, 2003) . Third, as there is a continuous flow of this information, infants can fine-tune the visual system to the task at hand. Although we did not measure patterns of eye movements, we assume that the motion display evoked infants to intermittently gaze at both objects, which enabled them to discover the relations involved and prospect an end state.
When motion is absent, proximity may aid in comparing objects. The impact of static proximity is probably less powerful than a dynamic display that contains motion as well as proximity. Therefore, when we hid the motion of the block and only proximity was left, younger infants might have no longer been able to compare both objects. However, at 12 months of age, infants no longer needed motion information to scale objects. Proximity was sufficient at this age, which again points out the significance of a direct visual comparison between both objects by looking. Actually, when differences in size and position are small, adults will also benefit from proximity to measure objects either directly by scaling one object to another object or indirectly by using a ruler to measure the objects as common experience shows. In the latter case, the ruler is held close to the object one measures.
Our results showing the significance of motion for the discovery of relations between objects agree with findings of a number of other studies that involve infants' perception of objects. For example, Kellman and Arterberry (1998) argued that motion is the principal source of information for segregation of objects in very young infants. Johnson and Mason (2002) argued that young infants organize underspecified stimuli into coherent percepts with the aid of motion. Jusczyk, Johnson, Spelke, and Kennedy (1999) demonstrated that 4-month-old infants do not perceive unity in static displays but respond to unity only when objects are in motion. In line with this, Johnson and Mason (2002) and Craton (1996) argued that the earliest age at which infants have been found to perceive the unity of a stationary, partly occluded object is 6.5 months.
At 16 months of age, infants needed neither motion nor proximity. What about the underlying process at this age? Results show that 16-month-old infants could compare both objects at the longer distance of 25 cm, even when they could not gaze at both objects intermittently. This result agrees with other findings of Dejonck-heere et al. (2006) that showed that seeing the initial phase of the event was sufficient for infants of 16 months to differentiate the outcomes. How do infants assess, then, whether the size and position of an object agree with those of a container for objects that are located farther apart, or when intermittent gazing at both objects is not possible? Does this force them to memorize one object while seeing the other object? Does the process of gazing become less important for containment perception with age? For sure, objects need to be observed, and a frame of reference is necessary to assess the size and position of the objects. From the present research, it is unclear what this frame of reference is at this age. To conclude how the oldest group of infants scale the objects to each other, we need to consider other alternatives.
One possibility is that they use an abstract frame as Baillargeon and her colleagues (Baillargeon, 2004; Baillargeon & Wang, 2002; Hespos & Baillargeon, 2001a , 2001b suggest. From their research, it is not clear, however, which geometry infants use to reason quantitatively about object properties such as width. A possibility is that they categorically perceive objects as either large or small. Such could be the case in, for instance, Aguiar and Baillargeon's (2003) study. This would explain why event information was not needed in their study because size differences were large. Such a categorization may work for size differences that are large but not for smaller ones and certainly not for object position. Another possibility could be that infants use features of the layout of the display as a frame in the latter case, such as the background or foreground. This hypothesis agrees with results of . In our study, both objects were shown against a common textured background of the display box. If infants did use this background as a frame, they selected an adequate structure that allowed them to sufficiently scale the object's size and position. Further research is needed to investigate whether these cues are indeed used, which would also hint at the beginning of utilization of a ruler, albeit an idiosyncratic one, and serial reasoning.
Together, the results of the present study and our earlier studies indicate that the development of infants' understanding of physical object relations is intrinsically connected to their capability of gathering information from events that take place. Infants have to attune their exploratory systems to the events that take place, requiring goal-directed gazing and focusing of attention, both embodied and situated processes that are supported by the way the event is organized (Clark, 1999; Wilson, 2002) . A similar conclusion was made by Johnson et al. (2004) when studying object perception in 3-month-old infants. The present research shows that the youngest groups of infants need the support of the event to get attention focused to relations and targets that are of importance for prospecting the end state of the event. This conclusion is in line with other research that shows the significance of access to event information for discovery of the significant relations on which an end state depends. For instance, Keen, Carrico, Sylvia, and Berthier (2003) highlighted the importance of visual information for guiding action. They showed that an infant's ability to catch a rolling ball depends on the visual information that is available. The authors manipulated visual information about a barrier and the trajectory of a ball with 9-month-old infants. They found that anticipatory reaching was difficult when the trajectory of the ball was partially hidden from view and that the ability to intercept the ball on its trajectory increased with complete view of that trajectory.
The present study highlights the significance of event information for infants' developing insight in object functions. According to Gibson and Pick (2000) , paying attention to events is a cornerstone to extracting information about the relatively permanent aspects of the environment. For object functions, these permanent aspects can be described as sets of relative geometrical (e.g., distance, orientation, shape, and size) parameters and relative dynamical parameters (e.g., inertia; see Smitsman et al., 2005) . With age, infants learn to detect what these parameters are. Embodied activities such as looking and goal-directed actions on objects that enable them to generate events for themselves must play a significant role in the discovery of those parameters. In our view, these activities are not peripheral to infants' developing understanding of objects and their functions. Instead, they are interconnected with this developing insight and with cognitive activities such as memory and reasoning, and form an integral part of it.
